Libraries in Litigation: The Role of Procedural and Jurisdictional Rules in Large-Scale Copyright Use Cases by Hansen, David R.
 David R. Hansen. Libraries in Litigation: The Role of Procedural and Jurisdictional Rules 
in Large-Scale Copyright Use Cases. A Master’s Paper for the M.S. in L.S degree. April, 
2012. 43 pages. Advisor: Laura N. Gasaway. 
This paper examines the application of federal procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive 
rules that apply to libraries and their adversaries in determining their appropriate role as 
plaintiff or defendant in copyright litigation. In recent years, libraries and their host 
institutions have been called into court to answer complaints of copyright infringement 
for large-scale uses of copyrighted works. Associations, class representatives, and 
publishers represent copyright owners’ interests as plaintiffs, while libraries and 
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the position of appropriate parties as litigants, while leaving others to seek relief through 
legislation or other avenues. 
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2 
Introduction 
This paper examines how library activities fit within the relatively complex set of 
procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive rules that determine the appropriate roles for 
plaintiff and defendant in copyright litigation. Although libraries have managed creative 
works since before the first copyright act took effect,
1
 they have only recently been hailed 
into court to answer for a variety of large-scale uses of copyrighted works. In particular, 
plaintiffs have contested library and related institutional use of copyrighted works in 
mass digitization projects,
2
 institutional streaming-media systems,
3
 and in creation of 
electronic reserves
4
 and coursepacks.
5
 In all of these cases, libraries and their host 
                                                 
1
 Francis Wormald, The English Library Before 1700: Studies in History (London: University of London, 
Athlone Press, 1958). Wormald, like others writing on this time period, provides some vivid descriptions of 
the innovations libraries employed as they attempted to balance user access with protection of both the 
physical and intellectual integrity of the work. Wormald recounts, for example, how English libraries 
struggled with changing the method by which libraries would chain books to the shelf, in an attempt to 
better balance preservation with increased user access. Ibid., 215.  
2
 The Authors Guild, Inc., v. HathiTrust, Case No. 1:2011cv06351, Complaint (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 12, 2011). 
The Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., Case No. 1:2005cv08136, Complaint (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 20, 2005).  
3
 Association for Information Media and Equipment v. The Regents of The University of California, Case 
No. 2:2010cv09378, Complaint (C.D. Cal., Dec. 7, 2010).  
4
 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, Case No. 1:2008cv01425, Complaint (N.D. Ga., April 15, 2008).  
5
 American Psychological Association v. Chapple, Case No. 2:2011cv00751, Complaint (W.D. Wash., May 
2, 2011).  This case follows in a long line of copyshop litigation cases, but is unique in that Seattle 
University and individual faculty members have been joined as third-party defendants. Other similar cases 
include Basic Books, Inc., v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and Princeton 
 3 
institutions are forced to act as defendants, in effect representing both their own interests 
and the interests of their users. Likewise, associations, class representatives, and 
publishers attempt to represent authors and copyright owners’ interests as plaintiffs in 
these suits.   
Whether and to what extent those parties are the proper plaintiffs and defendants 
in copyright litigation is determined by a complex set of federal procedural, 
jurisdictional, and substantive rules. As some commentators have already observed in the 
context of the Google Book Search Settlement, these rules are not mere formalities, but 
form a substantive parts of the legal code; they are designed to preserve the appropriate 
role of courts and legislature in the policy making decision.
6
 These rules also exist to 
create a balance of responsibility between users and owners, and to ensure that their 
rights are not unduly interfered with by outsiders with adverse interests.
7
  This paper 
explains the importance of those rules in the context of libraries and the roles that they 
have traditionally filled with respect to users. It concludes with suggested clarifications 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press v. Michigan Doc. Serv. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). For a more thorough account of 
these and similar cases, see Ann Bartow, “Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to 
Photocopy Freely,” University of Pittsburg Law Review 60 (1998): 149.   
These activities have been most visibly contested at the academic library level, probably because 
of the scale with which those libraries operate. Some larger public libraries, such as the Boston Public 
Library, have also made similar uses. David Rapp, “Internet Archive Tests New Ebook Lending Waters: 
In-Library, and License-Free,” Library Journal (March 2, 2011), 
http://www.libraryjournal.com/lj/home/889508-264/internet_archive_tests_new_ebook.html.csp (accessed 
February 26, 2012). 
6
 Pamela Samuelson, “The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform,” Wisconsin Law Review (2011): 
513–560.  
7
 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (New York: Aspen, 2012).  
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that would maintain the position of appropriate parties as litigants, while leaving others to 
seek relief through legislation or other avenues. 
This paper first outlines the background legal issues and cases that have 
confronted libraries and similar organizations as they attempt to manage and provide 
access to the copyrighted works in their collections on a large scale. Second, the paper 
explains the basic procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive rules that determine who the 
appropriate plaintiff and defendant are in copyright litigation.  In this section, the paper 
also compares these rules to existing cases that are relevant to libraries.  Finally, the 
paper concludes by making suggestions for libraries to move forward in light of these 
rules, and by identifying areas where additional judicial or legislative guidance is needed. 
Background 
When the British Parliament passed the world’s first true copyright act, The 
Statute of Anne in 1710,
8
 it did so with the auspicious goal of providing direct protection 
(and therefore incentives) to authors, rather than the publishers, printers, and associated 
guilds that had historically benefited from similar legal protections.
9
 In the United States, 
the drafters of the Constitution embraced this approach when they granted Congress the 
ability to “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive right to their respective Writings . . . .”10  It is for this 
                                                 
8
 Statute, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19. 
9
 H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, “The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 
1710,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 25 (2010): 1248–1350.  
10
 U.S. Const., Art.I, §8, clause 8.  
 5 
reason that the exclusive rights of copyright vest initially in the author of the work,
11
 and 
that, absent an explicit transfer, those rights are presumed to remain with the author.
12
    
Despite the emphasis on directly incentivizing authors, U.S. copyright has always 
permitted authors to transfer some or all of their rights (including the right to sue to 
protect those rights)
13
 to third parties, who could then enforce rights as they chose. In 
recent years, however, the authority of plaintiffs to act on author-created works has been 
extended even further by application of two particular legal mechanisms. First are class 
actions, a litigation device which allows parties to extend the resolution of a common 
dispute in one case to all members of a class, which is itself defined to include members 
with certain common features. Class action lawsuits in the copyright context have been 
used for some time,
14
 but the class definitions employed have tended to turn on relatively 
                                                 
11
 Copyright Act of 1976, U.S. Code 17 (2006), § 201(a).  Although U.S. law has always granted rights to 
authors, modern law has realigned itself with authors in a way that prior acts had not. In the words of 
former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, the 1976 Act marked a “break with the two-hundred-year-
old tradition that has identified copyright more closely with the publisher than with the author.” Barbara 
Ringer, “First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976,”  New York Law School Law Review 22 (1977): 477, 
490.  
12
 Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988); Cohen v. United States, 98 Fed. 
Cl. 156, 162 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 2011).  
13
 Copyright Act of 1976, U.S. Code 17 (2006), §§ 201–205. For a thorough description of copyright 
ownership and transfers, see William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright (Eagan, Minn.: West Publishing, 2012), 
§ 5:101–157.  
14
 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright (Eagan, Minn.: West Publishing, 2012), § 21:29. Buffalo 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 
1984); David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). 
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definable class commonalities such as members that employed a particular licensing 
agency through which all members of the class made their works available.
15
   
More recently, however, plaintiffs in class actions suits have attempted to apply 
wide-ranging class definitions that allow plaintiff class representatives to represent the 
interests of a large and diverse group of copyright owners—and, more specifically, 
authors—against defendants who engaged in mass digitization.16 The proposed class 
representatives in The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google,
17
 for example, (contesting the 
Google Book Search project of scanning and digitizing millions of copyrighted works) 
proposed that the class in that case would be defined as “[a]ll persons residing in the 
United States who hold a United States copyright interest in one or more Books 
                                                 
15
 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa 
Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1990). 
16
 One might resist describing these suits as against digital libraries as such. While entities like Google have 
engaged in mass digitization with the result of library-like online collections, its profit seeking motivation 
may serve to distinguish its activities both in ideological terms and in terms of its legal position (especially 
with respect to its fair use argument) from more traditional libraries. The precise distinction between this 
project and “true” libraries is debated. Pamela Samuelson, “Google Books is not a Library,” Huffington 
Post (October 13, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pamela-samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-
lib_b_317518.html (accessed February 28, 2012).  A related definitional issue is what one considers “mass 
digitization.” Clearly Google Books or HathiTrust are such projects, but what about a single library 
digitizing an entire special collection? The legal implications of such a classification are not yet clear, but 
could become important if legislation passed to cover these projects.  
Other commercial digitization projects have struggled with the same issue. When Lexis and the 
New York Times Company decided to digitize back collections of articles, attempts to brand its new 
collection as a digital library drew the ire of groups like the American Library Association. New York 
Times, Inc., v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, Brief Amici Curiae of the American Library Association and the 
Association of Research Libraries in Support of Respondents (Feb. 16, 2001). 
17
 For a thorough review of the litigation and settlement process, see Jonathan Band, “The Long and 
Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement,” John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 9 
(2009): 227–329.  
 7 
reproduced by Google as part of its Library Project, who are either . . . authors of such 
Books or [certain]  heirs, successors in interest or assigns of such authors.”18 Even in 
cases aimed against more defined digitized collections—most recently, court records and 
briefs—have requested similarly broad class definitions (e.g., “all attorneys and law firms 
. . . that authored works . . . that are contained in [Westlaw and LexisNexis] 
databases.”).19 In response to these broad definitions and generalizations about author 
interests, subsets of authors (especially academic authors)
20
 have objected.
21
 Federal rules 
governing class action suits are designed to ensure that classes are defined in a way that 
member and outsiders’ interests are truly protected, but the operation of those rules in this 
mass-digitization context remains untested as none of the suits has reached the judicial 
decision stage.  
For libraries (especially those that seek to engage in mass digitization projects 
involving a large number of works), a clear understanding of these rules is important to 
help decision-makers determine the categories of works and authors that might raise or 
lower risk of a class action suit opposing digitization initiatives. At the same time, many 
libraries (mainly, academic) also have a concern for protecting the interests of local or 
                                                 
18
 The Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., Case No. 1:2005cv08136, Motion to Certify Class, 2 (S.D.N.Y., 
Dec. 15, 2011). 
19
 White v. West Publishing Corp., Case No. 12cv1340, Complaint, 5 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 22, 2012).  
20
 The Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., Case No. 1:2005cv08136, Letter from Professor Pamela 
Samuelson to Judge Denny Chin, Academic Author Objections to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification 
(S.D.N.Y., February 13, 2012).  
21
 National Writers Union, “National Writers Union Opposes Settlement of Class-Action Lawsuit Against 
Google for Copyright Infringement,” National Writers Union, http://www.nwu.org/google-settlement 
(accessed February 20, 2012).  
 8 
institutional authors. Understanding and aligning library actions with these authors, 
within the context of these rules, may be useful in protecting the interests of both in a 
more thoughtful and accurate way than when a variety of authors are swept up together in 
a far-reaching class action suit.  
The second mechanism by which the role of plaintiffs has extended is through the 
assertion by associations of the ability to bring copyright infringement suits on their 
members’ behalf. In Association for Information Media and Equipment v. The Regents of 
the University of California, for example, plaintiffs (“AIME”) alleged that the university 
defendants had infringed copyright by duplicating DVDs for use in a digital video stream, 
which was then made available through a closed course content system.
22
 The 
associational plaintiff (AIME) is comprised of members that are themselves copyright 
owners, brought suit based on its members’ copyright interests.23  The association argued 
that it was permitted to do so under judicially-developed constitutional rules governing 
associational standing.
24
  
The Authors Guild, in its suits against both Google
25
 and the HathiTrust digital 
library,
26
 stakes out a similar position based on the copyright interests of its members. In 
                                                 
22
 Association for Information Media and Equipment v. The Regents of the University of California, Case 
No. 2:2010cv09378, Complaint (C.D. Ca., Dec. 7, 2010).  
23
 Ibid.  
24
 Association for Information Media and Equipment v. The Regents of the University of California, Case 
No. 2:2010cv09378, Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss (C.D. Ca., April 4, 2011). 
25
 The Authors Guild, Inc., v. Google, Inc., Case No. 1:2005cv08136, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Defendant Google Inc.’s Motion To Dismiss,  (S.D.N.Y.,  Feb. 6, 2012). 
26
 The Authors Guild, Inc., v. HathiTrust, Case No. 1:2011cv06351, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 31, 2012). 
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both of those cases, however, the Authors Guild takes the position one step further by 
asserting standing on behalf of its members, and requesting relief yet more broadly, 
asking the court to enjoin the defendants from using or displaying the works of the 
plaintiff, and in addition, any other works protected by copyright. Ultimately, it asks that 
the court order the impoundment of “all unauthorized digital copies of works protected 
by copyright.”27  
Based on the limited constitutional grant of authority to federal courts over 
“cases” and “controversies,”28 federal courts permit a party to bring suit asserting only 
her own particularized rights;
29
 generally, the protestations of third parties are considered 
insufficient to constitute a justiciable case or controversy in the constitutional or 
prudential sense of those terms. The doctrine of associational standing, which allows 
associations to bring suit on their members’ behalf when the members would have 
standing in their own right, is one limited exception to that rule.
30
  Because of the 
uniqueness of each copyrighted work and the particular rights attached to those works, 
the ability of an association to represent the interest of many (sometimes undisclosed) 
authors through associational standing remains contested. Authorities are split on the 
applicability of the doctrine in the copyright context.
31
  Understanding how this doctrine 
                                                 
27
 The Authors Guild, Inc., v. HathiTrust, Case No. 1:2011cv06351, First Amended Complaint, 27–28 
(S.D.N.Y., Oct. 6, 2011). 
28
 U.S. Con 
29
 Valley Forge Christian College v Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 US 
464, 474-75 (1982). 
30
 Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333, 342 (1977). 
31
 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright (Eagan, Minn.: West Publishing, 2012), § 21:28 (“[A]ssociational 
standing is not permitted under the Copyright Act, which expressly limits standing to legal or beneficial 
 10 
allows further-removed plaintiffs into court to contest mass uses of copyrighted works is 
an issue with which libraries must grapple.  
Rules governing who could be liable for copyright infringement are similarly 
important for libraries to understand. At least two theories of secondary liability—based 
either on the relationship of the institution with the particular user (vicarious liability), or 
on the actions of the institution with respect to that user (contributory liability)—are well 
accepted as ways to hail institutional-copyright users into court.
32
  
Other efforts to bring libraries into court to answer for alleged infringements are 
less straightforward. One major reason is because many state libraries and academic 
libraries that are state supported are considered arms of the state in which they reside. 
Because states enjoy immunity from suit in federal court due to the Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine of sovereign immunity,
33
 plaintiffs must followed a twisted path through a 
history of judge-created legal fictions to enforce their rights. In almost all situations, a 
state defendant will survive the lawsuit unscathed by monetary damages,
34
 but even in 
suits seeking only injunctive relief, identifying and naming the proper party as defendant 
can be a challenge.  
                                                                                                                                                 
owners of exclusive rights.”); Melville Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright: A Treatise on the 
Law of Literary, Musical and Artistic Property (New York: Bender, 2012), § 12.02[B] (“It is possible, 
nonetheless, that the societies could have associational standing to bring suit.”).   
32
 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 262 (1997). 
33
 U.S. Const., Amd. XI. Michael P. Allen, Michael Finch, and Caprice L. Roberts, Federal Courts (New 
York: Aspen Publishers, 2009), 424–512.  
34
 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  
 11 
 Typically, plaintiffs can proceed with their suit for injunctive relief if they file the 
suit against a state official whose actions are alleged to violate federal law.
35
 The doctrine 
that permits this, occasionally referred to as the “Young fiction” after the case which 
established the rule,
36
 is the lone avenue through which plaintiffs may request a federal 
court to order state officials to cease unlawful activity. One important question is “which 
state official?” Unlike most infringement suits where traditional principles of agency and 
employment law apply to make it a simple task of naming the employer, who is 
ultimately responsible for the acts of its employees, sovereign immunity and the Young 
doctrine obfuscate the chain of responsibility for state defendants.   
 In Cambridge University Press, Inc., v. Patton (“Georgia State”),37 plaintiffs 
alleged that Georgia State University infringed its copyrights based on the copying and 
distribution of copies of materials placed in university’s electronic reserves system at the 
direction of instructors. Plaintiffs named as defendants were members of the university 
administration and members of the university board of trustees.
38
  Because the Ex Parte 
Young doctrine allows federal courts only to enjoin defendants who have acted illegally, 
the named defendants objected that their place in the suit, based on their “supervisory 
authority” to implement copyright policies at the university, did not sufficiently connect 
them with the alleged violation.
39
 The judge in that case, concluding that the defendants 
                                                 
35
 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
36
 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 262 (1997). 
37
 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, Case No. 1:2008cv01425, Complaint (N.D. Ga., April 15, 2008). 
38
 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, Case No. 1:2008cv01425, Order (N.D. Ga., March 17, 2011). 
39
 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, Case No. 1:2008cv01425, Reply Brief in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss (N.D. Ga., January 13, 2011). 
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must have “ ‘some connection’ with the alleged misconduct by virtue of his office,”40 
was unable to say as a matter of law that this connection did not exist in the case before 
it, and required that the parties submit evidence and argument at trial for the court to 
determine whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine applied to the members of the board 
administration named as defendants.
41
  
At first blush, the solution to this problem is simple; a plaintiff must simply name 
the parties who actually engaged in the infringing activity in order to bring a successful 
action for an injunction. At least two practical considerations make this a difficult task. 
First, in the university context, publisher-plaintiffs may be reticent to name the actual 
individuals who scan, post, and distribute their works or who request that they be so 
copied and distributed, as with many e-reserve and course management systems, those 
individuals are not just users of copyrighted content, but also its creators; in large 
measure, these works are produced by faculty members upon whom publishers rely for 
their content. Second, for mass-digitization projects, tracking down the actual individual 
(or individuals) who completed the steps required to scan and upload each individual 
copy of a work would be tedious and difficult to establish for systems involving 
numerous employees. 
The next section of this paper explores in more detail these more contentious 
issues in the broader context of the rules of litigation that determine who is allowed into 
court as plaintiff and defendant. These rules form a part of the legal code that is not often 
                                                 
40
 Cambridge University Press v. Patton, Case No. 1:2008cv01425, Order, at 13 (N.D. Ga., March 17, 
2011). 
41
 Ibid., 13–14.  
 13 
discussed in the context of copyright as applied to libraries,
42
 but nonetheless are 
important, if not determinative, when weighing the risk of litigation for many large-scale 
projects with copyright implications. Libraries that are increasingly aware of the need to 
approach substantive copyright matters from a risk-management standpoint, 
43
 should 
build into those risk calculations an understanding of when and by whom they can be 
brought into court.   
The Rules of Litigation 
Copyright protection exists almost exclusively as a creature of federal law.
44
 
Determination of copyright infringement suits is the exclusive domain of the federal 
courts,
45
 and as such, is governed by federal litigation rules.
46
 In determining the 
appropriateness of the parties involved in litigation, courts must look to the text of the 
                                                 
42
 This is probably because consideration of these issues has been unnecessary to resolve most copyright 
issues in the library context. See Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Law For Librarians and Educators : 
Creative Strategies and Practical Solutions (Chicago: American Library Association, 2012). This paper 
serves to point out the number of emerging situations where they are important and worth consideration.  
43
 Triangle Research Library Network, The Triangle Research Libraries Network’s Intellectual Property 
Rights Strategy for Digitization of Modern Manuscript Collections and Archival Record Groups (2011), 
http://www.trln.org/IPRights.pdf (accessed February 25, 2012).  
44
 Copyright Act of 1976, U.S. Code 17 (2006), § 301(a) (preempting competing state laws). State-law 
copyright continues to apply to sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, but that protection will 
expire on February 15, 2067.  Ibid., § 301(c). The U.S. Copyright Office recently concluded a report 
recommending that Congress displace state law protections with special federal copyright law provisions. 
U.S. Copyright Office. Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings (Washington, D.C., 
2011). 
45
 U.S. Code 28 (2006). § 1336(a).  
46
 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 372 F.3d. 471 (2d. Cir. 2004). 
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Copyright Act itself, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
47
 jurisdiction statutes,
48
 and a 
history of interpretive case law. In general, these rules apply to define the parties that can 
bring a copyright infringement suit, and to define the parties which can be held 
responsible for copyright infringement.   
Who is Responsible for Copyright Infringement?  
The plaintiff in any copyright infringement suit must establish two elements: “(1) 
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that 
are original.”49 In establishing direct liability, the plaintiff must generally be able to show 
that the defendant infringed one of the exclusive rights held by the plaintiff,
50
 through 
either direct evidence of copying, or, as if more often the case, through indirect evidence 
that the defendant had access to the work and that the resulting copy was substantially 
similar to the protectable elements of the original work.
51
 Direct liability always requires 
                                                 
47
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2011).  
48
 U.S. Code 28 (2006). 
49
 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
50
 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.2011).  The exclusive rights include the 
right to do or authorize any of the following:  
 (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works 
based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work 
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case 
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. U.S. Code 17 (2006). § 106. 
51
 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) 
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showing some volitional and “direct action or participation” on the part of defendants, 
however.
52
 In the library setting, directly liability is fairly easy to imagine; a librarian 
who freely and regularly copies and distributes copyrighted library holdings might be just 
one example.  
Secondary Liability—In many cases, plaintiffs will seek remedies against 
centralized third-parties who, though not directly infringing themselves, have profited 
from or enabled allegedly infringing activities. Lawsuits against file-sharing services like 
Napster or Grokster,
53
 as well as earlier suits against online bulletin-board services,
54
 
proceeded under a theory of secondary infringement as a way to centralize liability for a 
wide variety of alleged infringements perpetrated by users who were difficult if not 
impossible to locate.  
 Secondary liability in copyright generally comes in two varieties: contributory 
infringement and vicarious infringement.  While the Copyright Act mentions neither 
species, the Supreme Court, recognizing a long line of case law before it, has recognized 
the validity of both. It explains that “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally 
inducing or encouraging direct infringement, . . . and infringes vicariously by profiting 
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”55  
                                                 
52
 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
53
 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
54
 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
55
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
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More specifically, a contributory infringer is one who “with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of 
another.”56  The rationale behind contributory infringement is intuitive; In MGM Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., where plaintiffs contested Grokster’s file-sharing platform, the 
Supreme Court explained: 
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, however, a powerful 
one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day using 
StreamCast’s and Grokster’s software. When a widely shared service or product is 
used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the 
protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical 
alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary 
liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.
57
 
 
 Vicarious liability is built upon older principles of principal-agent, or master-
servant liability, developed in tort law whereby an employer can be liable for the actions 
of her employee.
58
 The general formulation of the rule is that a defendant can be 
vicariously liable if it has “(1) the right and ability to exercise control over a directly 
infringing party and its activities and (2) obtained a direct financial benefit from the 
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 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1977); 
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57
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Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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infringing activities.”59 “Right and ability” is sometimes read as encompassing the ability 
of the defendant merely to guard against or police the activities of the third-party 
infringers in the past,
60
 and “direct financial benefit” requirement can mean both obvious 
and direct financial interest,
61
 or a financial benefit that results from users drawn to the 
defendant because of the infringing activities of the third party (e.g., a bootleg record 
stand owner that draws in consumers to come shop at the flea market of  the defendant).
62
 
Both varieties of secondary liability require an underlying act of direct 
infringement,
63
 but do not require the plaintiff to pursue those underlying infringers 
themselves. Instead, plaintiffs can choose to proceed in an action against a centralized 
defendant who enabled the infringing activity.
64
  For libraries, this secondary liability 
would most naturally be raised in the context of patrons; while it may difficult for  a 
plaintiff to pursue many individuals who have used library holdings in allegedly 
infringing ways, the pursuit of the library (or, in the case of academic libraries, the host 
                                                 
59
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63
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 In the online context, fears of the broad application of secondary liability against internet service 
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Limitation Act, Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), U.S. Code 17 (2006), § 512. 
That section provides service providers with a safe harbor against infringement if they comply with certain 
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institution) as the central enabler might be attractive. The application of these rules, while 
still developing, is not highly contested, however.  
 Sovereign Immunity— The modern doctrine of sovereign immunity has its roots in 
the Eleventh amendment, which was ratified to overturn the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Chisolm v. Georgia,
65
 a 1793 case in which the Court asserted that the still-new 
federal judiciary had power to hear cases between private citizens and the States.  The 
text of the amendment provides that “the Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”66  
Taken at face value, the amendment prevents only suits against a state by “Citizens 
of another state” (or foreign state), but not a state’s own citizens.  A broader reading, 
however, views the statement of the Eleventh Amendment as emblematic of a greater 
point, that under pre-constitutional principles, a sovereign state cannot be sued—in its 
own courts or any other—unless it has consented to such suit.67 The principle applies 
generally to all arms of the state, including state supported libraries, state university 
libraries and other state actors.
68
  
                                                 
65
 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
66
 U.S. Const., amend. XI.  
67
 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999). 
68
 The applicability of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is limited to “States and state officials in 
appropriate circumstances . . . but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations.” Mt. 
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). Whether the doctrine would apply 
to public libraries, for example, would depend on factors such as the amount of state-level control, as 
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Certain narrow exceptions to the doctrine have developed. Sovereign immunity 
does not, for example, bar jurisdiction over suits brought by the United States against a 
state,
69
 nor against suits brought by other states.
70
 Courts may also find that a state has 
waived sovereign immunity by its actions,
71
 and Congress may, in certain limited 
circumstances, strip or abrogate state sovereign immunity.
72
  Outside of those limited 
circumstances, the general rule is that a state is not subject to suit in federal court based 
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70
 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). 
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Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid, which held that Congress could not, by virtue 
of the patent and copyright clause in Article I of the Constitution, validly abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, other courts have taken this to mean that the CRCA is likewise ineffective.  Mktg. Info. Masters, 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (S.D. Cal. 2008); Nat'l Ass'n of 
Boards of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Rodriguez v. Texas Com'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 53 (5th Cir. 2000).  
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on its sovereign status. While the history and appropriateness of this shift are debated,
73
 
the basic point is that states themselves are not subject to suit for damages in federal court 
for copyright infringement.  
The Ex Parte Young doctrine is an important exception to this general rule. It 
allows plaintiffs to bring suit in federal court for prospective injunctive relief against 
particular officers of the state, but not the state itself.
74
 The Young doctrine is based on 
the idea that when an officer of the state acts in contravention of supreme federal law, she 
acts ultra vires is therefore without authority—and immunity—under the law. By acting 
illegally, the officer is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected 
to the consequences of his official conduct.”75 The Young doctrine has been 
circumscribed to allow only for prospective injunctive relief against the official’s future 
conduct, but prohibits a court from awarding any retroactive monetary relief.
76
 In the 
copyright context, this particular aspect of the doctrine is significant because it means 
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 Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, and Ernest A. Young, “State Accountability for Violations of 
Intellectual Property Rights: How to ‘Fix’ Florida Prepaid (and How Not To),” Texas Law Review 79 
(2001): 1037.  
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 Ibid., at 160. 
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  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984). The Pennhurst court 
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by the Eleventh Amendment.” Ibid.  
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that, for state defendants such as public universities, the threat of large statutory damages 
(up to $150,000 per work infringed) is eliminated.
77
 
In considering which defendants are appropriate in copyright litigation, the 
doctrine is important because it requires that plaintiffs name particular state officials 
against whom the court would issue and injunction. In Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce 
Exch. No. 299,
78
 plaintiffs brought a patent infringement suit against officials at the 
University of Arkansas who were charged with overseeing the university’s patent 
policy.
79
 In dismissing the suit against the state officials, the court held that “allegations 
that a state official directs a University’s patent policy are insufficient to causally connect 
that state official to a violation of federal patent law—i.e., patent infringement.”80 The 
court went on to explain that the plaintiff must establish a connection between the alleged 
violation of federal law and the individual brought before the court.
81
 It is for this reason, 
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 Copyright Act of 1976, U.S. Code 17 (2006), § 504. Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, “Statutory 
Damages in Copyright: A Remedy in Need of Reform,” William and Mary Law Review 51 (2009): 439. 
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 Ibid., at 1342-43.  
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 Ibid. 
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for example, that one cannot simply name the governor or some other high-level official 
to answer for any state-level act that might violate federal law.
82
 
Thus, determining the level of control that the named individual actually exercises 
is key. In the Georgia State University litigation, for example, named defendants were 
largely responsible for creating university policies regarding the e-reserves system; 
undetermined, however, was their ability to monitor and enforce the policy. The judge in 
that case refused to decide before trial, on the thin record of evidence before her, that 
defendants did or did not have this ability.  
As explained above, determining the correct state-official defendant may be 
important for some plaintiffs, because (1) lower-level officials may be difficult to 
discover, and (2) some defendants may be unpopular or more sympathetic. Publishers 
that rely upon faculty-authored works may be hesitant to bring suit against those same 
individuals alleging copyright infringement. Indeed, in the relatively few modern 
copyright infringement suits that have been brought by publishers contesting widespread 
uses of copyrighted works in the academic environment, only two suits have named 
faculty members,
83
 and only one has done so voluntarily.
84
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Who Can Bring a Lawsuit?  
The U.S. Constitution extends the authority of the federal judiciary only to actual 
cases and controversies.
85
 As such, Federal Courts are referred to as courts of “limited 
jurisdiction,” because they are only able to hear cases in which the plaintiff has both the 
proper capacity to sue and a justiciable claim (i.e., a live dispute) for the court to decide.
86
 
Leaving aside the issue of the claim itself, who can bring suit is largely determined by 
rules of standing, which are designed to ensure, among others things, that the plaintiff 
before the court has suffered an “injury in fact,” (i.e., an “invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ ”).87 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reinforce this 
rule by requiring that “an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest.”88 In addition to these more general statements about the ability of parties to gain 
entry to federal courts, the Copyright Act provides that only the “legal or beneficial 
owner of an exclusive right under copyright” is permitted to bring a copyright 
                                                                                                                                                 
American Psychological Association v. Chapple, Case No. 2:2011cv00751, Answer and Third Party 
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infringement action.
89
 While most cases involving a copyright owner (or exclusive 
licensee) bringing suit on her own behalf fall neatly within these rules, at their edges lie 
the two mechanisms noted above—class actions and associational standing—that operate 
to allow the interests of unnamed parties to be litigated in copyright infringement suits. 
Class Actions—The modern class action lawsuit is a mechanism by which 
multiple parties and claims with certain commonalities can be joined together for a 
unified judicial resolution.  Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
four criteria that must be complied with in order to bring a class action lawsuit:
90
 “(1) the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions 
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”91 If the class complies with these 
four criteria, Rule 23(b) further provides that a class action can proceed only if it falls 
within three categories of suits: (1) lawsuits that, if maintained as separate actions, would 
create inconsistent judgments or that would impede the interests of other members not 
party to the action; (2) lawsuits where the party opposing the class has acted generally in 
a way toward the class that injunctive relief respecting the class as a whole is appropriate; 
and finally, (3) suits where “questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class 
                                                 
89
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90
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91
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action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”92  
 In the library setting, the most relevant class action copyright suit to date is the 
one filed against Google for the scanning of millions of books from the collections of 
academic libraries across the country.  The suit was initiated by the Authors Guild and, as 
class representatives, several named authors.
93
 Although not clear from the earlier filings, 
the class plaintiffs—at least at the settlement stage—proceeded under the theory that the 
suit satisfied the test of Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common questions of law and 
fact predominate over more individualized questions.
94
 For suits of this type, individual 
class members must be given notice of and opportunity to opt out of the litigation (or any 
resulting settlement). While thousands of authors have done so,
95
 the rights of many more 
are still caught up in the GBS litigation.    
The Google Books Search (“GBS”) case illustrates the problems with super-
litigants like the Authors Guild and the three named class representatives taking on the 
mantle of representing an incredibly large class, defined as all U.S. authors of books 
                                                 
92
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scanned for GBS. As is often the case in class action suits, the parties sought to settle 
rather than proceed through a further protracted lawsuit. 
96
  Rule 23 contemplates the 
settlement of class actions suits, but requires that, where the settlement would bind class 
members—in this case, the millions of U.S. authors—the court must first hold a hearing 
to find if the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
97
   
At the fairness hearing for the amended settlement in the GBS suit, two dozen 
supporters and objectors presented their concerns surrounding the settlement.
98
 Among 
the objectors was the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which raised serious concerns 
about the effect on the broad-reaching settlement on competition and the appropriateness 
of the judiciary as a place to resolve the problems that Google Books raised. In the words 
of the DOJ counsel, the settlement “grafted on . . . a series of forward-looking 
commercial transactions,” that tend fit better as a legislative solution than a judicially-
approved settlement.
99
  Many objectors focused on the substance of the settlement, which 
would have set up a forward-looking system through which Google could use and make 
available copyrighted works under a type of opt-out escrow system. Google would be 
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responsible to pay royalties to owners, but otherwise would escape liability.
100
 Based in 
part on these concerns, the presiding judge rejected the proposed settlement.
101
  
In terms of the appropriateness the class action representatives themselves, 
however, many others objected.
102
 Academic authors objected to the idea that their 
interests could ever be fairly represented plaintiffs who agreed that “open access” and its 
advocates (an increasingly popular method of distribution for academic work) were 
“plainly inimical” to the class.103  At the time of the writing this paper, three proposed 
class representatives remain.
104
 These plaintiffs have largely authored popular literature; 
their publications included trade works, works of fiction, and children’s books.105 None 
represent academic authors, whose works make up a large part of the Google Books 
corpus.
106
 Indeed, as the suit has progressed and plaintiffs have now moved for a 
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certification of their class, it has become clear that the interests of not just academic 
authors differ from the class representatives, but also of authors more generally.
107
 
So far, the class actions rules seem to have worked. The fairness hearing, which 
required judicial oversight of the proposed settlement, prevented a deal to be struck that 
would harm the interests of rightsholders not privy to the suit. The class certification 
process (which is still pending) requires that a district court first consider whether the 
Rule 23(a) requirements, listed above, are met.
108
  
For libraries, the precise contours of class action litigation rules may seem to be 
of little consequence. With shallow pockets and relatively diffuse digitized holdings 
among even the largest academic libraries, the risk of becoming the target of a massive 
class action suit on the scale of the Google Books Search suit is probably low. As 
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collections merge and access to reformatted digital copies of copyrighted works becomes 
more widespread, however, the specter of large-scale litigation may become more real.  
Understanding these rules may become more important, as will understanding strategies 
that might help both libraries themselves and the authors that they inevitably interact with 
to avoid costly and litigation that does not represent the real concerns of those parties.  
Associational Standing—The same concerns that exist in the class-action context 
can also arise in cases where plaintiffs allege associational standing. Associational 
standing, however, raises the additional problem that, unlike class action suits that are 
subject to specific rules that insure the fair representation of class members, it is unclear 
what mechanisms or rules exist or will need to be developed to guarantee that the broad 
relief requested by associational plaintiffs is limited in a way that protects non-
association members’ interests.  
“Associational standing carves only a narrow exception from the ordinary rule 
that a litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”109  To define that narrow exception, 
courts follow a three part test to determine whether associational litigants comply: “(a) its 
members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”110 The first two parts of the test are considered constitutional requirements; 
without compliance, there is not a proper case or controversy that the court can hear. The 
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third part of the test is considered “prudential,” meaning it is a self-imposed judicial 
restraint on authority, and one that can be altered if circumstances permit.  
In most copyright litigation, the first two parts of the test are easy enough to 
satisfy. Members either do or do not have interests sufficient to make a claim themselves. 
Similarly, for the second part of the test, the organization’s purpose is relatively easy to 
discern. Applying the third part of this test (necessity of participation of individual 
members) is more difficult, however, for two reasons. First, because establishing 
copyright ownership is an essential element in any copyright infringement suit,
111
 a 
plaintiff would ordinarily need to produce evidence pertaining to the rights in each 
individual work alleged to have been infringed. Plaintiffs could, at least in theory, satisfy 
this burden by producing registration certificates for the works of association members. 
Registration certificates count as prima facie evidence of a valid copyright and 
authorship, but can be disputed.
112
 Even this requirement would be quite burdensome for 
a large association to manage, and in almost all cases would be something that would 
require individual participation of members. To make matters more difficult, the specific 
rights in many works may also be split among many different owners under private 
contracts. In those situations, individual participation is almost certainly required to 
resolve ownership. This may be especially important in the context of digitized versions 
of works; courts have already been asked to address contractual disputes between 
publishers and authors regarding the scope of e-book rights.
113
 Whether contracts that 
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allocate rights to publish a “book” also include e-books is unclear and would need to be 
resolved on a work-by-work basis in suits involving many works,
114
 especially if those 
works are older and subject to contracts that are less clear about electronic rights.  
Second, individualized notice about particular works is also intrinsic to the 
scheme of limitations and exceptions found in the Copyright Act. Fair use, for example, 
evaluates the particular work at issue to understand the nature of the work (e.g., is the 
work fact or fiction?) and to evaluate its potential market.
115
 Other more specific 
exceptions—such as those found in Section 108—require even more detailed analysis, 
not just of the work at issue, but also the particular copies. Libraries and archives are, for 
example, permitted to digitize books that are damaged or deteriorating, but only after the 
library makes a reasonable effort to purchase a copy at a fair price.
116
 They can also make 
interlibrary loan copies for users that request works, copies of which cannot be obtained 
at a fair price.
117
 Without sufficient notice of which exact works are alleged to have been 
infringed, defendants cannot even begin to claim their rights under these specific 
limitations and exceptions.   
 Beyond the practical questions of litigating a copyright infringement lawsuit 
without reference to the individual copyrights involved, the text of the Copyright Act 
itself may pose a more insurmountable problem. Recall that the Copyright Act provides 
                                                 
114
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that only the “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is 
entitled . . .  to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed 
while he or she is the owner of it.”118 This section has not been interpreted in the 
associational standing context, but would seem to require an actual ownership interest or 
exclusive right to some of the rights associated with the work. Collective rights 
organizations (e.g., ASCAP) have avoided the problem by naming particular members 
and their respective copyrights in suits where those organizations are plaintiffs.
119
 On a 
small scale, naming as plaintiffs each member and their works entirely avoids the 
associational standing issue. But for contesting mass digitization projects, litigants such 
as the Author’s Guild may find the task of naming and identifying each interest a 
monumental task. Indeed, for the HathiTrust orphan works project that the Authors Guild 
is contesting, the task of identifying owners of the works involved is the very crux of the 
orphan works problem. 
                                                 
118
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
The first conclusion is that libraries should be aware of litigation scenarios that 
would enable a copyright infringement suit against large or unwieldy groups of plaintiffs. 
Likewise, libraries must remain aware of the various ways in which the actions of their 
users can land them in court. As this paper attempts to make clear, the rules that 
determine who gets into court, and on behalf of whom, are important to consider when 
evaluating a giving library project or service. Beyond simple awareness, however, is the 
conclusion that libraries need to be astute and proactive in understanding the changing 
legal landscape in which they reside. The hypotheticals discussed in the previous section 
are all current, live legal disputes with many unanswered questions.  Several modest, but 
specific suggestions may also be heeded to limit risk in the face of these litigation 
scenarios.  
First, libraries should pay careful attention when making large-scale uses of 
copyrighted works that may be owners by a heterogeneous group of owners. Libraries 
should recognize that a broadly defined position of potential class and association 
litigants may not be tenable under current law, but those questions are still unanswered 
until Google Books Search and HathiTrust suits are resolved. In the meantime, by 
understanding the dangers of such suits and evaluating the set of potential plaintiffs, 
libraries may be better able to assess risk for certain discrete collections that are unlikely 
to generate a class or associational objection (e.g., certain special collections, academic-
authored work).  
 Libraries should also be careful to understand their positions with respect to users. 
Direct, vicarious, and contributory liability are all real possibilities for libraries with user-
 34 
managed content. Whether it be e-reserve systems, library-managed publishing 
platforms,
120
 or any of the new electronic services that libraries are now providing, where 
users are asked to make copyright determinations on their own, the library should be sure 
to provide guidance and support. Indeed, under current law libraries and archives are 
required to give at least minimal notice about Copyright restrictions to certain users if the 
library seeks to fall within the special exceptions provided for them under Section 108 of 
the Copyright Act.
121
 Those requirements are relatively basic and do not, for example, 
guide the user through a fair use determination or any of the other areas of copyright law 
that one must evaluate when making many ordinary uses of copyrighted works. Enhanced 
guidance (and perhaps control) is especially important for state libraries and universities 
that seek to take advantage of sovereign immunity. Keeping in mind the importance of a 
decision in the Georgia State University litigation, care should be taken to understand 
how to structure workflows, policies, and acts of copying so that the appropriate parties 
are brought into court as a state-official defendants.  
All of these practical considerations are tempered by the uncertain status of law in 
this area. Numerous opportunities for judicial or legislative clarification exist for both 
sides of the litigation equation.  The Georgia State University litigation represents an 
opportunity to clarify the way that sovereign immunity affects liability for copyright 
infringement. Clarifying the role of state officials in their supervisory roles will be 
important for wide variety of suits against states. This may be of particular importance in 
the copyright context because existing theories of liability (direct, secondary) are defined 
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in a way that could make it difficult for plaintiffs to identify and pursue cases against 
state actors in any meaningful way.   
For the role of plaintiffs, a clearer understanding of how (or whether) mass 
digitization litigation can continue to proceed in the class action context, is critical. The 
factors that serve to differentiate potential plaintiff classes should be further developed; 
mapping commonalities and difference among rights holders based on those factors could 
help determine those areas that are most susceptible to large group opposition.  Some 
answers are sure to surface if the class certification process proceeds in the Google Book 
Search case proceeds.  As the Google Books Search litigation has illustrated to this point, 
special care should also be taken to ensure that class certification and settlements take 
into consideration the legislative prerogative of Congress.   
The associational standing question is another area that the courts or Congress 
should clarify— is associational standing permitted at all in copyright litigation of this 
type? While Section 501(b)’s requirement of a legal or beneficial interest is a clear 
obstacle, if associational standing is allowed, it should be implemented in a way that 
circumscribes remedies in those cases to apply only in response to the particular rights 
owned by association members. While Rule 23 provides safeguards to protect class 
members, associational standing rules have no parallel system.  Without such limitations, 
associational standing could stand as a subterfuge to the class action process. 
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